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Abstract
This paper critiques the All-Subjected Principle. The All-Subjected Principle is one 
of the most prominent answers to the Boundary Problem, which consists in deter-
mining who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision. The All-
Subjected Principle comes in many versions, but the general idea is that all people 
who are subjected in a relevant sense with regard to a democratic decision should be 
entitled to participate in that decision. One respect in which versions of the All-Sub-
jected Principle differ concerns how to best understand ‘subjectedness’. One view 
spells out ‘subjectedness’ in terms of legal bindingness. Another view understands 
‘subjectedness’ in terms of coercion. I argue that the All-Subjected Principle is 
extensionally inadequate on both views in that it yields verdicts that are at odds with 
our considered judgements about certain cases. These cases involve legal norms of 
referral or international administrative assistance.
Keywords All-Subjected Principle · Boundary Problem · Legal bindingness · 
Coercion · Legal norms of referral · International administrative assistance
This paper examines the All-Subjected Principle, which is one of the most promi-
nent answers to the Boundary Problem. The Boundary Problem consists in deter-
mining who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision. Accord-
ing to the All-Subjected Principle, entitlements to participation in democratic 
decisions should depend on subjectedness.
Many different versions of the All-Subjected Principle can be found in the lit-
erature on the Boundary Problem. The versions differ, among other things, in how 
they spell out ‘subjectedness’. One view focuses on legal bindingness, the other 
on coercion. In this paper, I argue that the All-Subjected Principle is extensionally 
inadequate on both views. An answer to the Boundary Problem is (fully) extension-
ally adequate if and only if the answer coheres with our considered judgements 
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regarding democratic inclusion (and exclusion) in particular cases, i.e. our consid-
ered judgements about who should (and who should not) be entitled to participate in 
the democratic decisions that feature in (real or hypothetical) cases. I present cases 
that attempt to show that democratic inclusion should neither depend on legal bind-
ingness nor on coercion.
In the first section, I introduce the Boundary Problem and the All-Subjected 
Principle. In the second section, I review the current debate about the extensional 
adequacy of the All-Subjected Principle and, in this context, defend the All-Sub-
jected Principle against two objections that have been put forward in the literature. 
In the third section, I try to show, by presenting a kind of case that has so far been 
ignored in the literature, that versions of the All-Subjected Principle that under-
stand subjectedness in terms of legal bindingness are extensionally inadequate. In 
the fourth section, I argue, by means of a modified version of the case presented in 
the third section, that versions of the All-Subjected Principle that focus on coercion 
are extensionally inadequate, too. In the fifth section, I address an objection, which 
is based on an alternative interpretation of the All-Subjected Principle. In the sixth 
section, I summarize my findings and comment on their significance.
The Boundary Problem and the All‑Subjected Principle
The All-Subjected Principle is a prominent answer to the Boundary Problem. 
The Boundary Problem consists in finding a convincing answer to the following 
question:
BP
Who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision-making?1
BP comes up, e.g., in the case of resident aliens and expatriates (Beckman 2006, 
2014; López-Guerra 2005). Should resident aliens be entitled to vote in elections in 
their host countries? Should expatriates be entitled to vote in elections in their home 
countries?2
1 The problem is called ‘the boundary problem’ by Whelan (1983, p. 13). Other labels are “the problem 
of inclusion” (Dahl 1989, p. 119), ‘the problem of the unit’ (Dahl 1989, p. 193) and ‘the problem of con-
stituting the demos’ (Goodin 2007, p. 40).
2 BP also looms large in other issues such as the legitimacy of border regimes (Abizadeh 2008, 2010; 
Miller 2010), the democratic representation of future generations (Beckman 2013; Tännsjö 2007) and 
the justification of global democracy (Agné 2010; Miller 2009; List and Koenig-Archibugi 2010; Andrić 
2017).
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Many different formulations of the All-Subjected Principle, which often amount 
to different versions, can be found in the literature.3 In this paper, I distinguish two 
basic versions:
ASP
A person should be entitled to participate in a democratic decision if and only 
if the person is subject to the decision.4
ASP*
A person should be entitled to participate in a democratic decision if and only 
if the decision is made by a state to whose decisions the person is normally 
subject.5
In this and the following three sections, I focus on ASP. The fifth section deals with 
ASP*.
ASP comes in several versions, which differ regarding their criterion for what it 
takes to be subject to a democratic decision. Two basic views about how to under-
stand ‘subjectedness’ can be found in the literature on the boundary problem and 
lead to different versions of ASP.6 According to the first version,
ASPL
A person should be entitled to participate in a democratic decision if and only 
if the person is legally bound by the decision.
According to the second version,
ASPC
3 Proponents of the All-Subjected Principle include Abizadeh (2012), Beckman (2006, 2008, 2009, 
2013, 2014), Cohen (1998, p. 223, n. 1), Dahl (1989), Erman (2014), Habermas (1998), López-Guerra 
(2005), Miller (2009) and Owen (2012). Let us consider some formulations of the All-Subjected Princi-
ple that can be found in the literature. A classic formulation by Robert A. Dahl reads as follows: ‘Every 
adult subject to a government and its laws must be presumed to be qualified as, and has an unqualified 
right to be, a member of the demos’, Dahl (1989, p. 127). Claudio López-Guerra writes that ‘all indi-
viduals who live permanently under the laws and binding decisions of the polity should be included’, 
López-Guerra (2005, p. 222). Ludvig Beckman’s more recent formulation of the All-Subjected Principle 
has it that ‘anyone bound by a legal rule is a subject, in the sense pertinent to democratic rights’, Beck-
man (2014, p. 256). Eva Erman states the principle in its general form as requiring ‘that all those who are 
subjected to the laws, i.e., those whose actions are governed by them, should have a say in their making’, 
Erman (2014, p. 538). Arash Abizadeh maintains ‘that all those subjected to the exercise of political 
power be included in the demos, i.e., granted a right of democratic say over political decisions’, Abizadeh 
(2012, p. 878). David Miller states that a democracy’s ‘domain should extent to include all those who 
will be coerced by its decisions’ and that ‘being coerced by a demos does generate a claim for inclusion’, 
Miller (2009, pp. 214 and 225).
4 Notice that some of the quotes provided in the previous footnote suggest a formulation of ASP without 
the ‘and only if’ part. However, such a formulation would even increase ASP’s problems with over-inclu-
siveness that I press in this paper.
5 What I said in the previous footnote about the ‘and only if’ phrase with regard to ASP also applies, 
mutatis mutandis, to ASP*.
6 On combinations of the basic versions, see Beckman (2014) and Goodin (2016).
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A person should be entitled to participate in a democratic decision if and only 
if the person is exposed to coercion by the state that implements the decision.
What can be said in favour of ASP,  ASPL and  ASPC? One important argument 
appeals to understanding democracy in terms of autonomy, self-rule or self-govern-
ment (differences between these concepts can be ignored for our purposes). In this 
vein, López-Guerra claims that ‘if democrats endorse the ideal of self-government, 
anyone who is subject to the laws of a democratic polity should be included in the 
citizen body’ (López-Guerra 2005, p. 219). Likewise, Abizadeh argues that ‘demo-
cratic self-rule means that the exercise of political power conforms to the collective 
will of those subjected to it, and why the scope-condition of democratic legitimacy 
is that all those subject to the exercise of political power have a right of democratic 
say’ (Abizadeh 2012, p. 878). Prima facie, I find the kind of argument put forward 
by Abizadeh and López-Guerra promising and will come back to it at several points.
A second kind of argument for ASP appeals to its alleged extensional adequacy. 
This is the main focus of the next sections, where I argue that, although  ASPL and 
 ASPC can be defended against some objections that concern extensional adequacy, 
 ASPL and  ASPC eventually fail because they are extensionally inadequate.
Extensional Adequacy and ASP
The argument from extensional adequacy for ASP appeals to the presumably plau-
sible solutions ASP yields for instances of BP. The standards of plausibility are pro-
vided by our considered judgements regarding democratic inclusion in particular 
cases. The methodological background of the argument is some kind of reflective 
equilibrium or coherentism: the assumption that normative principles like ASP need 
to cohere with our considered judgements about particular cases as well as with our 
general normative and factual beliefs (cf. Daniels 2018).
A terminological remark. In what follows I will speak about ‘widespread judge-
ments’ when I refer to what people in fact think (or what I take them to think) and 
about ‘our considered judgements’ when, in addition, I state reasons for thinking 
that the judgements are correct. An answer to BP is extensionally inadequate to the 
extent that it does not cohere with our considered judgements about democratic 
inclusion, and an answer to BP risks being extensionally inadequate to the extent 
that it does not cohere with widespread judgements about democratic inclusion.
The argument from extensional adequacy for ASP can be illustrated by compar-
ing the judgements implied by ASP with the verdicts yielded by the main competitor 
of ASP—the All-Affected Principle, according to which
AAP
A person should be entitled to participate in a democratic decision if and only 
if the person is affected by the decision in a relevant way.7
7 Proponents of AAP include Arrhenius (2005, 2018, 2019), Brighouse and Fleurbaey (2010), Cohen 
(1971), Dahl (1970), Goodin (2007), Shapiro (1999, 2012) and Young (2000).
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There are different versions of AAP, which yield different verdicts regarding 
instances of BP. For the sake of brevity, let us focus on what is perhaps the most 
influential version of AAP: the possibilist version defended by Robert Goodin, 
According to Goodin, ‘this version requires us to include in the demos every interest 
that might possibly be affected by any possible decision arising out of any possible 
agenda’ (Goodin 2007, p. 59). Tweaking Goodin’s formulation a bit,8 the possibilist 
version of AAP can be formulated as follows:
AAPP
A person should be entitled to participate in a democratic decision if and only 
if the person could be made better off or worse off by any alternative available 
in that decision relative to how well or badly off the person could be on any 
other alternative, including alternatives that were not on the agenda.
But is not almost every person affected by almost any decision in the sense of 
 AAPP? Goodin confirms this suspicion and claims ‘that (at least in principle) we 
should give virtually everyone a vote on virtually everything virtually everywhere 
in the world’ (Goodin 2007, p. 63). However, this implication, though embraced 
by Goodin, strikes many theorists as too inclusive (e.g. Miller (2009, p. 215), Song 
(2012, p. 50), and Andrić (2017, Sect. 2)). It is at odds with widespread judgements 
and practices regarding democratic inclusion. It is an open question, e.g., if resident 
aliens should be entitled to vote in their host countries. But we take it for granted 
that persons who are not citizens of a state and reside outside that state should not 
be entitled to participate in the elections of this state.9 Therefore,  AAPP risks being 
extensionally inadequate: it fails to deliver verdicts that cohere with widespread 
judgements regarding democratic inclusion.
At first glance, ASP seems to fare better in this regard.  ASPL seems to imply 
that resident aliens should be entitled to participate in decisions in their host coun-
tries because they are legally bound by the decisions taken there. But  ASPL does 
not seem to imply that non-citizens who reside outside a country should normally 
be entitled to participate in elections in that country.10 Since they reside outside 
the country, the democratic decisions made in the country normally do not seem 
to bind them legally. Likewise, on  ASPC, resident aliens are exposed to coercion by 
their host countries. But persons who reside outside a foreign country normally do 
not seem to be exposed to coercion by that country. The upshot is that ASP, unlike 
 AAPP, seems to be extensionally adequate insofar as it avoids the kind of over-inclu-
siveness that haunts  AAPP.
However, on closer examination, ASP is faced with two problems regarding its 
extensional adequacy. The first problem is that ASP seems to imply, implausibly, 
8 Notice that the term ‘decision’ as Goodin uses it in the foregoing quote does not refer to a choice 
between different alternatives but rather to an alternative.
9 By ‘we’, I do not mean all persons. Obviously, Goodin is not one of ‘us’ in the sense that I am using 
‘we’. Rather, ‘we’ has to be understood in the context of the coherentist framework that I assume in this 
paper and that I sketched at the outset of this section as referring to all and only those persons who share 
the widespread judgements and practices in question.
10 I am ignoring the special issue of border regimes, see Abizadeh (2008) and Miller (2010).
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that transients should have voting rights in their host countries (see Goodin (2007, 
p. 42) and Dahl (1989, p. 128)). If a tourist happens to be in a country while the host 
country is having national elections, ASP seems to imply that the tourist should be 
entitled to vote in these elections. For tourists are bound by the laws of their host 
countries and exposed to sanctions if they do not comply with these laws.
Defenders of ASP have suggested solutions for the problem of transients.11 In this 
paper, I will not try to evaluate these solutions. Rather, I want to point out that the 
problem of transients is a problem for any proposed solution to BP. It is a problem 
not only for ASP but also for AAP, because transients are affected by the decisions 
made in their host countries. But it is also a problem for any other prima facie plau-
sible solution to BP because, even though transients should all things considered 
plausibly not be entitled to participate in elections in their host countries, there are 
also considerations that (pro tanto) speak in favour of giving them the vote for such 
elections. After all, democracy is self-government—every person who is governed 
should, ideally, also be able to participate in the governing. And transients are gov-
erned in their host countries, albeit only for a very short time. The upshot is that it 
does not speak against ASP, as compared to other answers to BP, if the problem of 
transients has not been solved yet.
The second problem  ASPL is faced with is also a problem of over-inclusiveness. 
Goodin points out that many states claim authority to make laws that apply to every 
person, even to non-citizens who reside abroad, and argues that universal jurisdic-
tion means that non-citizens abroad are subject, in the sense of  ASPL, to these laws 
(Goodin 2016). It therefore seems that, if  AAPP is too inclusive, then so is  ASPL.
This is also a problem for  ASPC if we assume that being exposed to coercion by 
a state via law coincides with being bound by that law. Goodin offers a profound 
analysis of the possibilities to avoid this coincidence and argues that every possibil-
ity results in problems of over- or under-inclusiveness for  ASPC. While I am sympa-
thetic to this argument, I will, for brevity’s sake, not examine it here and only argue 
that  ASPL can be defended in a different way against Goodin’s claim that  ASPL is 
in the same boat as  AAPP as far as over-inclusiveness is concerned. If  ASPL can be 
defended against this claim, then so can  ASPC—at least those versions of  ASPC that 
are co-extensive with  ASPL, i.e. the versions on which a person is exposed to coer-
cion just in case the person is legally bound.
Here is the defence. I submit that  ASPL delivers the correct results in cases of 
universal jurisdiction. For if a state makes laws that apply to non-citizens abroad, 
then denying those non-citizens a say with regard to the laws amounts to a heter-
onomous relation in which the non-citizens are governed without participating in 
the governing. This constellation is at odds with the idea that democracy is self-
government of the people.
But does this not mean that  ASPL is just as inclusive as  AAPP? It does not. States 
can simply refrain from making laws that apply to every person. This would solve 
11 Suggestions can be found, e.g. in Beckman (2009), Dahl (1998), Erman (2014), López-Guerra (2005) 
and Owen (2012). In fact, Erman’s and Owen’s solutions are built on an alternative understanding of the 
All-Subjected Principle, namely ASP*, which I reject in the fifth section.
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the problem for  ASPL.12 By contrast, virtually any law a state makes will affect, in 
the sense of  AAPP, every person. This is why the over-inclusiveness objection can-
not be rebutted for  AAPP by a similar manoeuvre. On  AAPP, states cannot escape 
the need for universal inclusion even by making no laws at all. This is because of the 
laws that states could make.
Notice, finally, that universal jurisdiction without universal inclusion, while at 
odds with the ideal of democracy, is not necessarily wrong all things considered. For 
the ideal of democracy might conflict with other ideals, and these other ideals could 
all things considered justify universal jurisdiction without universal inclusion. How-
ever, even if this were the case, there would be democratic costs, as  ASPL rightly 
points out.
The bottom line is that the objections that have been raised in the literature 
regarding the extensional adequacy of ASP fail. By contrast, I will argue that the 
problems that I am going to develop for  ASPL and  ASPC in the next two sections, 
respectively, decisively speak against these principles.
Against  ASPL
The following case demonstrates that  ASPL is extensionally inadequate:
Bureaucracia and Lazyland
Bureaucracia is a country with a detailed body of traffic regulations, called the 
Traffic Law, which regulates on which side of the road to drive, what the traf-
fic signs have to look like and so on. Lazyland is a country in which the traffic 
laws of Bureaucracia are held in high esteem. In order to save time, money 
and manpower, Lazyland does not bother to make substantial laws in this area 
of legislation but simply adopts a legal norm of referral that gives legal force 
to the traffic laws of Bureaucracia in Lazyland. Lazyland’s Law of Traffic 
Rules simply states that Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law is valid in Lazyland. One 
day, Bureaucracia is going to make a decision about a change in its Traffic 
Law, namely to adopt a speed limit on highways. The people of Lazyland are 
strongly opposed to this idea and would like to vote against it.13
To keep things simple, I make the following assumptions: all citizens of Bureau-
cracia reside within Bureaucracia; there are no children, persons with mental 
13 Real-life examples of legal norms of referral are so-called enforcements of foreign judgements; see, 
e.g. Campbell (1997).
12 Since a solution to BP is a function with two variables (persons and democratic decisions), a demo-
cratically permissible arrangement can be reached by holding the enfranchised persons fixed and restrict 
the range of issues over which democratic decisions are made. Cf. Goodin’s (2007, p. 66) remark on the 
‘decisional power’ of demoi and the remarks on the ‘scope’ of democracy by Arrhenius (2018, p. 93, 
2019), Dahl (1989, pp. 207, 209) and Miller (2009). This is the background for my defence regarding 
 ASPL and universal jurisdiction. Simply put, states (or other entities) can restrict democratic decisions 
such that only a fixed set of persons are bound by them.
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impairments or felons among these citizens; every person residing in Bureaucracia 
is also a citizen of Bureaucracia. Mutatis mutandis for Lazyland.14
Most people, I assume, would intuitively judge that the people of Bureaucra-
cia—the Bureaucracians—should be entitled to decide about the speed limit without 
including the people of Lazyland—the Lazylanders—in the decision. This judge-
ment qualifies as a considered judgement because it finds support in the platitude 
that democracy is government of the people by the same people. The decision clas-
sifies as an act of government of and by the people of Bureaucracia. In virtue of 
Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules, any decision about Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law 
will be binding for the Lazylanders.15 But this is so only because the Lazylanders 
decided voluntarily that it be so, via a decision made of and by the Lazylanders. The 
Bureaucracians do not presume to govern the Lazylanders.
The situation is analogous to the case of two individuals where one individual 
makes decisions about his life and the other individual voluntarily adopts the maxim 
to copy all the decisions of the first individual. Assume the first individual decides 
between buying a red hat or a blue one and the second has a preference for buying 
the blue hat but would buy the red one if the first individual decided so. It seems 
clear that the first individual does not have to take into account the preference of the 
second individual. The first individual is just exercising his autonomy and not inter-
fering with the autonomy of the second individual.
ASPL yields the wrong answer in Bureaucracia and Lazyland. Since Lazyland’s 
Law of Traffic Rules makes it the case that the people of Lazyland are legally bound 
by Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law,  ASPL implies that the Lazylanders should be entitled 
to participate in Bureaucracia’s decision about adding a speed limit to its Traffic 
Law.  ASPL fails to recognize that the decision in question is part of the self-govern-
ment of the people of Bureaucracia.
Let us now consider three objections. The first objection denies that Bureau-
cracia’s Traffic Law is legally binding for the Lazylanders. What is binding for the 
Lazylanders is only Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules, so the objection goes, whereas 
Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law is only needed to ascertain the contents of Lazyland’s 
Law of Traffic Rules.16
This objection fails because it confuses the sources of law and the sources of 
legal interpretation. According to the objection, Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law is not 
legally binding for the Lazylanders but merely a source of legal interpretation: 
the Traffic Law only serves to ascertain the contents of Lazyland’s Law of Traffic 
Rules. From a legal perspective, however, it is clear that the legal norms referred 
to in legal norms of referral are legally binding (assuming that the legal norms 
of referral are themselves legally binding). Accordingly, there simply is no ques-
tion for legal practitioners in Lazyland as to whether Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law is 
legally binding: of course, it is—in virtue of Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules, that 
14 Beckman (2009) and López-Guerra (2014) discuss the cases of children, mentally impaired persons 
and felons in the context of BP.
15 Or so I claim, see the objections below.
16 This objection was raised by Gustaf Arrhenius.
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is: because Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules is legally binding in Lazyland and states 
that Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law is legally binding there, too.17
According to the second objection, the claim that both the Law of Traffic Rules 
and the Traffic Law are legally binding in Lazyland contradicts the logic of norms. 
The objection can be spelled out in different ways, depending on one’s understand-
ing of legal norms and the logic of norms in general. A natural way to spell out 
the objection goes as follows. Assume that Bureaucracia changes its Traffic Law by 
including a speed limit on highways. If a Lazylander drives too fast, she has violated 
only one legal norm—a norm against speeding. However, by claiming that both 
Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law and Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules are legally binding 
in Lazyland, I seem to be committed to the claim that the Lazylander has violated 
two legal norms.18
A head-on response to the objection consists in insisting that the speeding Lazy-
lander has violated two legal norms. By claiming that the speeding Lazylander has 
violated only one legal norm, the objection seems to presuppose that legal norms are 
imperatives: the Lazylander is certainly addressed only by one legal imperative—
‘don’t drive faster than … on highways!’—and if legal norms are imperatives, then 
the Lazylander has violated only one legal norm. However, the presupposition that 
legal norms are imperatives is problematic. After all, there are many legal regula-
tions—think of H. L. A. Hart’s ‘secondary rules’—that are commonly labelled 
‘legal norms’ even though they do not seem to be imperatives. Moreover, the view 
that the speeding Lazylander has violated two legal norms is compatible with the 
position that she has disobeyed only one legal imperative: one can just add that the 
two legal norms violated by the Lazylander—Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law and Lazy-
land’s Law of Traffic Rules—together entail the legal imperative not to drive faster 
than … on highways.
However, it is doubtful if the objection succeeds even if we assume that legal 
norms are imperatives and that the speeding Lazylander has violated only one legal 
norm. Given these assumptions, we still have to get clear on which legal norm has 
been violated by the Lazylander. On the face of it, it cannot be Lazyland’s Law of 
Traffic Rules by itself, because this law does not say anything about speed limits 
on highways, but merely states that Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law is legally binding in 
Lazyland. Two other candidate legal norms are more promising. The first candidate 
is Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law, which can be understood as a self-standing imper-
ative (‘don’t drive faster than… on highways!’). Of course, the Traffic Law does 
not by itself apply to Lazylanders. However, the Traffic Law does apply to Lazy-
landers because Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules says so.19 The second candidate 
19 Is Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules a legal norm, i.e. an imperative, on this suggestion? And if so, who 
is addressed by it? These questions raise doubts about the proposal in question, but they are irrelevant in 
our context. Recall that I assume in this part of my response to the second objection, for the sake of argu-
ment, the problematic claim that is presupposed by the second objection: that legal norms are impera-
tives. This claim does not only have problems with legal norms of referral but with what H. L. A. Hart 
17 It might be worth mentioning in this context that the legal bindingness of norms is not a matter of 
degree: a norm is either legally binding or it is not, period. Hence, the Traffic Law is not legally binding 
to a lesser degree in Lazyland than the Law of Traffic Rules.
18 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this criticism.
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is not codified in a single law but is the conjunction of Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law 
and Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules. The Traffic Law and the Law of Traffic Rules 
can each be considered incomplete legal norms while they together form a complete 
legal norm. Here, the conjunction is to be understood as an imperative in the follow-
ing way: imperatives are, roughly, commands to do something that are addressed to 
somebody. Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law states one part of an imperative—viz. which 
behaviour is commanded—and Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules states (part of) 
another part—viz. who is addressed.
Let us turn to the third objection, which concerns the best understanding of 
 ASPL. Advocates of  ASPL might point out that the Lazylanders are bound only indi-
rectly by Bureaucracia’s law, namely via the law of Lazyland, and argue that  ASPL 
is meant to refer only to decisions that are directly binding for persons.  ASPL would 
then not imply that the Lazylanders should be entitled to participate in the decision 
about Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law.
This suggestion fails because many legal norms are binding only indirectly but 
all of them need democratic authorization. If a judge pronounces a sentence, for 
example, then the sentence is a legal norm that is valid only in virtue of another 
legal norm that empowers the judge to pronounce judgment. However, the sentence 
is of course made in the name of the people and democracy requires an uninter-
rupted chain of democratic authorization that connects the judge’s sentence via the 
empowering norm all the way up to the legislature, which is either identical with 
or, in representative democracies, authorized by the people. Hence,  ASPL should be 
understood as implying that legal norms require participation of those people who 
are subjected to those norms even if the norms are binding only indirectly.
A note on what I mean by ‘authorized by the people’ in the foregoing paragraph. 
Democracy is self-government: government of the people and by the (same) people. 
Public officials participate in governing the people. This means that public officials 
must be authorized to represent the people. This authorization, in democracies, hap-
pens in elections.20
Here is a possible reply to my response to the third objection. According to my 
response,  ASPL applies also to decisions that are indirectly binding but, as in the 
case of the judge,  ASPL can be satisfied through an uninterrupted chain of demo-
cratic authorization by the people and does not require direct participation of the 
Footnote 19 (continued)
called secondary rules in general. Given that I accept the claim only for the sake of argument, it is not on 
me to defend the claim or to explain how the claim can account for legal regulations that do not seem to 
be imperatives.
20 A critic might worry that the ideal of self-government is committed to the rejection of certain views 
within democratic theory—views, for example, regarding the nature of democratic representation and 
regarding the justification of democracy. I have a twofold response. Firstly, it is not clear that the ideal 
has such commitments—it is on the critic to show which views exactly and why would be ruled out by 
the ideal. Secondly, insofar as the ideal of self-government does rule out certain views within democratic 
theory, one would have to adjudicate between the ideal of self-government and the views that contradict 
the ideal. Should we dismiss the ideal or the views that are at odds with the ideal? My tendency would be 
to stick to the ideal because I think that the claim that democracy is self-government by the people is a 
conceptual truth. Thanks to anonymous reviewers for pressing me on these issues.
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people. Now, does it not follow from this response that the Bureaucracians (analo-
gously to the judge) can be considered authorized to make decisions that are indi-
rectly binding for the Lazylanders? If so, then  ASPL would not imply that the Lazy-
landers should be entitled to participate directly in the decision on Bureaucracia’s 
Traffic Law. For the Lazylanders would have authorized the Bureaucracians to make 
that decision without the direct participation of the Lazylanders.21
There are three related problems with this reply. First of all, the reply assumes 
that Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules is not just a legal norm of referral but (also) 
an authorizing norm, which empowers the Bureaucracians. On the face of it, this 
assumption is problematic because authorizing norms and norms of referral are 
different kinds of norms from a legal point of view, and the Law of Traffic Rules 
does not seem to be an authorizing norm but a norm of referral. The Law of Traffic 
Rules does not seem to be an authorizing norm for two reasons. On the one hand, 
the contents of the Law of Traffic Rules are relatively ‘meagre’, in particular, the 
Law of Traffic Rules does not specify any rights or duties of the allegedly author-
ized persons—the Law of Traffic Rules merely states that the Traffic Law is valid in 
Lazyland. On the other hand, while Lazyland lacks jurisdiction over Bureaucracia, 
normally persons who are legally authorized can also be held legally responsible (to 
ensure, in particular, that the authorized persons do not abuse their powers).
Secondly, if we assumed that the Law of Traffic Rules is an authorizing norm, 
then the Law of Traffic Rules would be more problematic from a democratic point 
of view than it seems in fact to be. For while the judge is merely authorized to pro-
nounce judgment on the basis of existing laws, the Bureaucracians would in effect 
be authorized to make laws that are binding for the Lazylanders. (Of course, the 
laws made by the Bureaucracians would have to be incorporated into the Traffic 
Law, but otherwise there would be no restrictions.) Authorizations to make laws, 
which would be present in the case under consideration if the reply were correct, 
require elections of representatives. But the Bureaucracians are not elected as repre-
sentatives by the Lazylanders.
Thirdly, even if the Law of Traffic Rules were meant to authorize the Bureaucra-
cians to make traffic laws for the Lazylanders, the Law of Traffic Rules could be 
invalid as an authorizing norm. It could be invalid, for example, because there might 
be constitutional requirements for authorizing norms in Lazyland that are not met 
by the Law of Traffic Rules. However, the Law of Traffic Rules would then appar-
ently nonetheless be valid as a legal norm of referral—unless we make the question-
begging assumption that a legal norm of referral just is an authorizing norm. (This 
assumption would not only be question-begging but also seems to be false; see the 
first two points of my response to the reply.) But if the Law of Traffic Rules is valid 
as a norm of referral and invalid as an authorizing norm, then we are again faced 
with the problem raised by the case of Bureaucracia and Lazyland—the reply then 
does not help the defender of  ASPL.
In sum,  ASPL delivers implausible—viz. over-inclusive—verdicts in Bureau-
cracia and Lazyland and in structurally similar cases that involve legal norms of 
21 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this reply.
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referral. The verdicts are implausible in that they contradict widespread intuitive 
judgements. These judgements are not mere intuitions but cohere with other relevant 
beliefs, as required by the method of reflective equilibrium, in that the judgements 
can be based on the ideal of democracy as self-government: government of the peo-
ple by the same people.  ASPL is, hence, at odds with our considered judgements 
regarding democratic inclusion.
Against  ASPC
This section argues that  ASPC is extensionally inadequate. To this end, I will intro-
duce a modified version of Bureaucracia and Lazyland. But let us first consider what 
 ASPC implies with regard to the original case.
Recall that, according to  ASPC, a person should be entitled to participate in a 
democratic decision if and only if the person is exposed to coercion by the state that 
implements the decision. Now, one might argue as follows: ‘Since the state of Lazy-
land does not only implement Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules in Lazyland but, by 
doing this, the state of Lazyland also implements Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law,  ASPC 
implies that the Lazylanders should be entitled to participate in the decision about 
Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law’. If  ASPC is understood in this way,  ASPC shares the 
extensional inadequacy that, as I have argued in the Against  ASPL section, accrues 
to  ASPL.
However,  ASPC can be interpreted in a more charitable way. On
The charitable interpretation
A state implements a decision only if the decision has been made by that 
state.22
Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law has not been made by the state of Lazyland, but by the 
state of Bureaucracia. For this reason, according to the charitable interpretation of 
 ASPC, Lazyland does not implement Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law but only Lazyland’s 
Law of Traffic Rules. Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law is, rather, implemented by the 
state of Bureaucracia, which, however, is not active in Lazyland and hence does not 
expose the Lazylanders to coercion.
In short, the charitable interpretation of  ASPC implies that the state of Lazyland, 
while generally exposing the Lazylanders to coercion, does not implement Bureau-
cracia’s Traffic Law, and the state of Bureaucracia, though implementing Bureau-
cracia’s Traffic Law, does not expose the Lazylanders to coercion. Consequently, the 
Lazylanders are not exposed to coercion by the state that implements Bureaucracia’s 
Traffic Law. Therefore,  ASPC implies that the Lazylanders should not be entitled to 
22 Strictly speaking, it is the demos of a state or state organs that decide what the state does. However, 
we normally attribute these decisions to the state. I think that this is unproblematic and will ignore the 
issue in what follows. However, people who disagree can understand the phrase that a ‘decision has been 
made by a state’ in a metaphorical way and focus instead on our practice of imputing the decision to the 
state.
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participate in the decision about Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law. The case of Bureaucra-
cia and Lazyland, hence, does not show that  ASPC is extensionally inadequate.23
However,  ASPC gets it wrong in the following case:
Bureaucracia and Lazyland (Extended Version)
[As in the original case:] Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules states that Bureau-
cracia’s Traffic Law is valid in Lazyland. The Bureaucracians are going to 
make a democratic decision about a speed limit on highways. The Lazylanders 
would like to participate in the decision and vote against the speed limit. [In 
addition to the original case:] Bureaucracia and Lazyland have agreed on an 
arrangement of international administrative assistance according to which 
Bureaucracian police officers patrol the highways in Lazyland and fine Lazy-
landers who do not abide by Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law.24
In Bureaucracia and Lazyland (Extended Version),  ASPC implies—also on the 
charitable interpretation—that the Lazylanders should be entitled to participate in 
Bureaucracia’s decision about its Traffic Law. Like the original case of Bureaucracia 
and Lazyland, the case of Bureaucracia and Lazyland (Extended Version) has it that 
Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law is valid in Lazyland in virtue of Lazyland’s Law of Traf-
fic Rules. In addition, though, in Bureaucracia and Lazyland (Extended Version), 
Bureaucracia provides international administrative assistance to Lazyland in vir-
tue of which the Lazylanders are exposed to coercion by the state of Bureaucracia, 
which implements the law in Lazyland. The above-mentioned charitable interpreta-
tion of  ASPC, according to which a state implements a decision only if the decision 
has been made by that state, is not relevant here, because Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law 
has been made by (or can be imputed to) the state of Bureaucracia.
One might object that the state of Bureaucracia does not implement Bureaucra-
cia’s Traffic Law in Lazyland by policing Lazyland’s highways. Rather, the state of 
Bureaucracia, so the objection goes, implements Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules in 
Lazyland. If the objection holds,  ASPC implies that the Lazylanders should not be 
entitled to participate in the decision about Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law
The objection fails. Let us assume, as stated in the objection, that Bureaucra-
cia implements the Law of Traffic Rules in Lazyland. If so, it still seems true that 
Bureaucracia also implements the Traffic Law in Lazyland. This seems true because 
the Bureaucracian police officers, when patrolling the highways of Lazyland, look 
up the conditions under which they ought to fine somebody, such as speed limits, 
in Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law. This behaviour—looking up of conditions and legal 
consequences in a law and acting so as to bring about the legal consequences—can 
naturally be called implementing the law.
23 Notice that a similar move is not open to  ASPL. The move is open to  ASPC because  ASPC can distin-
guish between the coercing entity (state), on the one hand, and the group of persons that make a demo-
cratic decision (demos), on the other. Coercing entities thus figure as a third element in  ASPC, which 
can be used to block certain mappings between persons and democratic decisions. Since  ASPL does not 
contain a third element, proponents of  ASPL cannot make a similar move.
24 For real-life cases of international administrative assistance, see, e.g., Damian (2009).
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However, let us choose a phrase that is neutral with regard to the objection and 
call the behaviour applying the law. The police officers apply the Traffic Law in 
Lazyland. Now, in order to deny that the state of Bureaucracia implements the Traf-
fic Law while affirming that the state of Bureaucracia implements the Law of Traffic 
Rules, proponents of the objection must accept something like the following Imple-
mentation Principle—a position about which legal norm is implemented by a state 
that applies a legal norm:
IP
For any two norms  n1 and  n2 of public law, if  n1 is legally binding in virtue of 
 n2, then a state that applies  n1 is thereby implementing  n2 and not implement-
ing  n1.
I have explained in the Against  ASPL section that, from a legal perspective, Bureau-
cracia’s Traffic Law is legally binding in Lazyland in virtue of Lazyland’s Law of 
Traffic Rules.25 If IP is correct, then the state of Bureaucracia implements the Law 
of Traffic Rules in Lazyland and does not implement its Traffic Law there.
However, proponents of  ASPC cannot accept IP because otherwise  ASPC is faced 
with severe problems. To illustrate, assume Bureaucracia has a constitution, which 
embodies fundamental principles that determine the general conditions under which 
laws are valid. From a legal point of view, Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law is legally 
binding in virtue of Bureaucracia’s constitution. But this means that, according to 
IP, when Bureaucracian police officers apply the Traffic Law in Bureaucracia, they 
are thereby implementing only Bureaucracia’s constitution but not the Traffic Law. 
Consequentially, on IP,  ASPC implies that the Bureaucracians should not be entitled 
to participate in the decision about changing Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law. That can-
not be right. Proponents of  ASPC must reject IP.
The upshot is that with regard to Bureaucracia and Lazyland (Extended Version), 
 ASPC implies that the Lazylanders should be entitled to participate in the democratic 
decision about Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law. But just like  ASPL’s verdict concern-
ing Bureaucracia and Lazyland, and for similar reasons,  ASPC’s verdict concern-
ing Bureaucracia and Lazyland (Extended Version) is implausible. The Lazylanders 
should not be entitled to participate in the decision about Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law. 
The decision about the Traffic Law is an instance of government of and by the peo-
ple of Bureaucracia. It is not the business of the Lazylanders how Bureaucracians 
regulate their traffic. The Bureaucracians do not presume to govern the Lazylanders. 
Rather, the Lazylanders are bound by Bureaucracian law and exposed to coercion by 
Bureaucracian police only because the Lazylanders themselves decided so.
This is not to say that the decisions of the Lazylanders are completely unproblem-
atic as far as the ideal of democracy is concerned. It can be argued that, by adopting 
25 Recall that I am making a legal claim here. A lawyer, when asked if Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law is 
legally binding in Lazyland, would answer: ‘Sure, the Traffic Law is binding in Lazyland because Lazy-
land’s Law of Traffic Rules states that this is so’. Notice also that my claim is compatible with the claim 
that Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law is legally binding in Lazyland in virtue of the decision of Lazyland to 
adopt Bureaucracia’s Law of Traffic Rules: this decision finds expression in Lazyland’s Law of Traffic 
Rules. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on these issues.
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foreign laws and letting foreign powers enforce these laws, the Lazylanders suf-
fer losses in terms of democracy. Such an argument seems particularly forceful if 
democracy is based on the (contested) doctrine of popular sovereignty but can per-
haps also be upheld without adopting this doctrine.26
However, the possible democratic losses do not justify the claim that the Lazy-
landers should be entitled to participate in the decision about Bureaucracia’s Traffic 
Law. If they were so entitled, we would face a constellation in which the governed 
(Bureaucracians) would be different from the governing (Bureaucracians and Lazy-
landers) as far as the Traffic Law is concerned. This would be a clear violation of the 
democratic ideal of self-government.
Moreover, the possible losses in terms of democracy that the Lazylanders might 
incur in virtue of the Law of Traffic Rules and the international administrative assis-
tance would be self-imposed. This cannot possibly justify limiting the democracy 
of the Bureaucracians by letting the Lazylanders participate in the decision about 
the Traffic Law. Rather, the possible losses would need to be remedied by the Lazy-
landers themselves. And this could be done by abandoning the Law of Traffic Rules 
and by cancelling the agreement about international administrative assistance. It is 
noteworthy, in this context, that while the Lazylanders should not be entitled to par-
ticipate in the decision about Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law, they should be so entitled 
with regard to decisions about Lazyland’s Law of Traffic Rules and about Lazy-
land’s consent to the agreement with Bureaucracia about international administra-
tive assistance.
To sum up,  ASPC is just as over-inclusive with regard to Bureaucracia and Lazy-
land as  ASPL, unless  ASPC is charitably interpreted such that a state implements a 
decision only if the decision has been made by (or can be imputed to) that state.27 
But even charitably interpreted,  ASPC is over-inclusive with regard to Bureaucra-
cia and Lazyland (Extended Version) and structurally analogous cases that involve 
international administrative assistance. The intuitively correct judgement is that, 
pace  ASPC, the Lazylanders should not be entitled to participate in the decision 
about Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law. This judgement coheres with, and can be based 
on, the ideal of democracy as self-government: government of the people by the 
same people. This shows that  ASPC is extensionally inadequate in that its impli-
cations regarding certain cases of democratic inclusion contradict our considered 
judgements.
26 According to the doctrine of popular sovereignty, the people’s unified will is the supreme authority in 
the state. See, e.g., Espejo (2015).
27 ASPC might be less inclusive than  ASPL, as mentioned in the Extensional Adequacy and ASP section, 
if a person can be legally bound without being exposed to coercion. But then  ASPC runs into other prob-




I have argued that  ASPL and  ASPC yield over-inclusive verdicts in Bureaucracia and 
Lazyland or in Bureaucracia and Lazyland (Extended Version). This section deals 
with alternative formulations of the All-Subjected Principle and its variants:
ASP*
A person should be entitled to participate in a democratic decision if and only 
if the decision is made by a state to whose decisions the person is normally 
subject.
ASPL*
A person should be entitled to participate in a democratic decision if and only 
if the decision is made by a state whose decisions are normally legally binding 
for the person.
ASPC*
A person should be entitled to participate in a democratic decision if and only 
if the decision is made by a state that normally implements decisions in ways 
that normally expose the person to coercion.
ASP* involves what we can label the Normality Condition: that a person is normally 
subject to the decisions made by a state. The Normality Condition is a necessary 
and sufficient condition, according to ASP*, for when a person should be entitled 
to participate in a democratic decision.  ASPC* and  ASPL* spell out the Normality 
Condition in terms of legal bindingness or coercion, respectively.
ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC* do not imply the implausible verdicts that ASP,  ASPL 
and  ASPC imply in the cases presented in the two foregoing sections. According to 
 ASPL*, the Lazylanders should not be entitled to participate in the decision about 
Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law in Bureaucracia and Lazyland, because the Lazylanders 
are normally not legally bound by the decisions made by Bureaucracia. Likewise, 
with regard to Bureaucracia and Lazyland (Extended Version),  ASPC* implies that 
the Lazylanders should not be entitled to participate in the decision about Bureau-
cracia’s Traffic Law because the Lazylanders are normally not exposed to coercion 
by implementations performed by Bureaucracia.
Notice that the phrase ‘normally’ in ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC* could be replaced 
by something like ‘systematically’, ‘by and large’, ‘regularly’ or ‘in most cases’. Per-
haps defenders of  ASPL* can alternatively focus on who is regularly legally bound 
by a state’s decisions in virtue of the state’s constitution. Anyhow, since none of 
these alternatives will impact the response that I present below, I will keep things 
simple by focusing on ‘normally’ and ignore alternative qualifiers.
It is often not clear, I think, whether proponents of the All-Subjected Principle 
endorse ASP or ASP*. Notice, however, that Erman explicitly endorses a principle 
along the lines of ASP*, according to which ‘all those who are systematically and 
over time subjected to the exercise of political power (authority) and to its laws, 
political decisions and rules, should systematically and over time have an equal 
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influence in the decision-making’ (Erman 2014, p. 539). She explicitly states that 
‘the “systematically and over time” requirement suggests an institutional approach 
to democracy, stating that [democratic] participation does not concern each and 
every decision but the complete set of decisions over time’ (Erman 2014, p. 539, 
footnote omitted; cf. Owen 2012).
I submit that, although ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC* avoid the problems that I pre-
sented in the two foregoing sections, ASP,  ASPL and  ASPC are on balance to be pre-
ferred over ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC*. To see why, we have to consider again why 
the All-Subjected Principle is attractive in the first place. Recall that the democratic 
ideal is the ideal of self-government: government of the people by the same people. 
This ideal can be justified in terms of autonomy, equality and fairness.28 For exam-
ple, Dahl writes that ‘[b]inding decisions are to be made only by persons that are 
subject to the decisions […] No lawmaker is, in the familiar expression, above the 
law. The assumption rests on the elementary principle of fairness that laws cannot be 
rightfully imposed on other persons by persons who are not themselves obliged to 
obey those laws. Moreover, […] this assumption […] is necessary to self-determina-
tion; for laws and rules imposed by an outsider would violate the self-determination 
of all those subject to the laws’ (Dahl 1989, pp. 107–108). And Miller maintains that 
‘the normal effect of coercion is to undermine personal autonomy […] It is hard to 
see how a democracy could be legitimate if it prevents outsiders from enjoying one 
of the conditions it is designed to protect’ (Miller 2009, p. 214). Although Erman, 
as mentioned, endorses the Normality Condition, she also holds that ‘[w]hat distin-
guishes democracy from other forms of government, such as dictatorship, is that it 
has components that express and secure some form of political equality. […] what is 
of concern here is a specific conception of equality, according to which anyone who 
is in a specific sense affected by a political decision (or law) has an equal opportu-
nity, secured through an equal right, to participate (directly or indirectly) in the deci-
sion about it’ (Erman 2014, p. 536, footnote omitted). These considerations suggest 
that if a person is governed without participating in the government then this person 
suffers losses in terms of autonomy, equality or fairness. Likewise, if a person is 
participating in the government without being governed herself, then this arguably 
involves losses in terms of autonomy, equality or fairness for the governed.
How does the ideal of democracy as self-government speak for ASP,  ASPL and 
 ASPC and against ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC*? The point is that ASP,  ASPL and 
 ASPC attempt to  track the relevant considerations of autonomy, equality and fair-
ness whereas ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC* do not. Suppose a person is legally bound 
by a decision and exposed to coercion by the state that implements this decision 
while it is neither the case that this state’s decisions are normally legally binding 
for the person nor that this state normally implements decisions in ways that expose 
the person to coercion. Considerations of autonomy, equality and fairness suggest, 
in line with ASP,  ASPL and  ASPC, that the person should be entitled to partici-
pate in the decision. But ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC* imply that she should not be so 
entitled. The Normality Condition entailed in ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC* fails as a 
28 For an overview on justifications of democracy, see Christiano (2018).
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necessary condition for when a person should be entitled to participate in a demo-
cratic decision.
How does my rejection of the Normality Condition relate to what I say about 
the cases in the two foregoing sections? There, I argued for the claim that the Lazy-
landers should not be entitled to participate in the decision about Bureaucracia’s 
Traffic Law. And as mentioned at the beginning of this section, ASP*,  ASPL* and 
 ASPC* yield this claim. Am I contradicting myself?29
It is true that ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC* get the cases in the two foregoing sec-
tions right because they involve the Normality Condition. But this just means that 
they get the right answers in these cases for the wrong reasons. My arguments in 
the two foregoing sections for the claim that the Lazylanders should not be entitled 
to participate in the decision about Bureaucracia’s Traffic Law are not based on the 
Normality Condition. Rather, I have pointed out that the claim is supported by wide-
spread intuitive judgements which cohere with the democratic ideal of self-govern-
ment. This ideal, as mentioned above, can itself be justified in terms of autonomy, 
equality and fairness.
To see that ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC* are at odds with the democratic ideal of 
self-government and its underlying considerations of autonomy, equality and fair-
ness, we must not consider the cases presented in the foregoing sections but cases 
that lack the particular features of the cases considered in the foregoing sections: 
legal norms of referral and international administrative assistance. Assume, for 
example, that the Bureaucracians decide that their Traffic Law is legally binding 
in Lazyland and that the Bureaucracians send police officers who patrol the high-
ways in Lazyland to implement the Traffic Law, while the Lazylanders do not issue 
relevant norms of referral or international administrative assistance. This would be 
impermissible from a democratic point of view because the Bureaucracian measures 
would qualify as government of the Lazylanders by the Bureaucracians and would 
violate considerations of autonomy, equality and fairness to the detriment of the 
Lazylanders. However, given that the Lazylanders would not normally be subject to 
the decisions by the Bureaucracians, ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC* get the wrong ver-
dicts in this case (whereas ASP,  ASPL and  ASPC get it right).
So, the Normality Condition fails as a necessary condition for when a person 
should be entitled to participate in a democratic decision. The Normality Condition 
also fails as a sufficient condition. Consider a state and a group of people for whom 
this state’s decisions are normally legally binding and coercive. If the state makes a 
decision that does not affect these people in said ways but the people are nonethe-
less entitled to participate in the decision, as is sufficient for rights to democratic 
participation according to ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC*, then this has costs in terms of 
autonomy, equality and fairness for those people who are legally bound by the deci-
sion in question and for whom the decision is coercive. ASP,  ASPL and  ASPC, on 
the other hand, provide the correct result. To give an example, take a federal state 
whose decisions are normally legally binding in all member states and expose the 
citizens there to coercion. If there is an exceptional law by the federal state that is 
29 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this problem.
1 3
Is the All-Subjected Principle Extensionally Adequate? 
not legally binding in one of the member states and does not expose the citizens in 
that member state to coercion, then the citizens of that member state should not be 
entitled to participate in that law.
To sum up, proponents of the All-Subjected Principle can avoid the criticisms I 
have presented in this paper by rejecting ASP,  ASPL and  ASPC and endorsing ASP*, 
 ASPL* and  ASPC* instead. But the democratic ideal of self-government—and the 
underlying considerations of autonomy, equality and fairness—support ASP,  ASPL 
and  ASPC better than ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC*.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that  ASPL and  ASPC, the two versions of ASP that can 
be found in the literature, are extensionally inadequate. I have also argued against 
ASP*,  ASPL* and  ASPC* by critiquing the Normality Condition. If my arguments 
are correct, we have strong reasons for rejecting the All-Subjected Principle—at 
least unless proponents of the All-Subjected Principle come up with a better version 
of their principle.
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